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as Cato’s chairman? No. Had the regulatory leviathan been tamed? 
No. Had foreign adventurism been reduced? No. Ad infinitum. And 
Comrade Chickenfoot could protest all he wanted that he was just 
a little think-tank cog in the Great Beltway Machine, but the record 
was clear. Bill learned that in dealings with former students, as in 
the Beltway, when you’re explaining, you’re losing. 
Afterward, in Bill’s office, he asked me whether it really had 
been necessary to have everyone in the audience stand for the 
national anthem of the Soviet Union. In the Hayek Auditorium. 




He and I spoke virtually every week for decades, and I learned 
something from him every time. I cannot believe that I will be 
able to call him no more, and I betray no secret when I say that 
America is substantially poorer for his passing. May William A. 
Niskanen rest in peace, and may his memory inspire all of us to 
strive toward his standard of excellence.
Thanks, Bill.
Benjamin Zycher is a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise 
Institute, a senior fellow at the Pacific Research Institute, and a member 
of the editorial advisory board of Regulation.
A Tough-Minded  
and Humane Man
By DaviD R. HenDeRSon
Having read Ben Zycher’s wonderful tribute to Bill Niskanen, I 
realize that I did not know Bill nearly as well as Ben did. I saw 
Bill about once a year on visits to Washington, when I dropped 
in on him at the Cato Institute. Thus, my tribute is less to his 
personality and more to his intellect and accomplishments. As 
anyone who has read much of his work knows, Bill’s writing 
reveals not only a first-rate intellect, but also an attractive per-
sonality and character. Part of that personality was a keen and 
somewhat self-deprecating sense of humor.
The main, though not the only, way that I’ll show my respect 
for Bill is one that he would have appreciated: by reviewing 
selected parts of his last book, an excellent and eclectic collection 
of essays entitled Reflections of a Political Economist (Cato, 2008). 
Anyone who knew Bill knew he could handle criticism, so I won’t 
hesitate to mention those few important points on which I dis-
agree with him. Bill would have expected no less.
Straight talker | First, though, some personal reminiscences. I 
first met Bill at a Liberty Fund conference at Ohio University 
in June 1975. He was about to go to what I—and, I expect, he—
thought would be a dream job: chief economist of the Ford 
Motor Company. I talked to him briefly one-on-one, and when I 
expressed my awe at his new position, he had an attractive “gee-
whiz, pinch-me” attitude rather than a snobbish one. As I later 
learned, that attitude was rare, particularly in Washington, D.C. 
Seven years later, in August 1982, I started work for him and 
Martin Feldstein at the Council of Economic Advisers. I was the 
senior economist for health policy at the CEA, working mainly 
under Marty, but I also covered various issues in regulatory policy 
and reported to Bill on those. Then in my second year at the CEA, 
when, partly as a result of Ben leaving the CEA and partly because, 
with the end of price controls on oil and gasoline, energy became 
less of a problem—funny how that works—I took on Ben’s energy 
portfolio. As a result, I reported to Bill more and got to appreciate 
his mind—and his integrity—up close.
Bill, although a political appointee, was not a “rah-rah, sup-
port-the-administration’s-bad-ideas” political appointee. He 
called them as he saw them. That doesn’t mean that he was 
always right; but he was almost always right.
One way I saw this integrity—and his sense of humor—early 
on was when he circulated the written speech he had given at 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in the fall of 1982. At the time, 
almost everyone thought we were still in a deep recession. I 
suspect that there was tremendous pressure within the Reagan 
administration for its top economic advisers to go beyond the 
data and be positive about the economy’s prospects. But because 
the recession/recovery data always lag by months, no one knows 
whether the recovery has begun until months later. Bill thought 
the economy’s prospects were good; he turned out to be right. 
But he, like everyone else, didn’t know whether the recession had 
ended. (It turns out that it ended within a month of his talk.) 
Here is how Bill led off his speech:
The good news is that I think the recession is over. The bad news 
is that I thought that three months ago.
Interestingly, pretty much everyone who knew him noticed and 
commented on Bill’s integrity. Even those on the attack, such as 
Ronald Brownstein and Nina Easton, commented with a favor-
able tone about Bill’s outspokenness in their 1982 book, Reagan’s 
Ruling Class: Portraits of the President’s Top One Hundred Officials. Bill’s 
outspokenness was so rare for a political insider that they had a spe-
cial section in their write-up of him entitled, “Niskanen At Large,” 
containing pithy quotes from him on the issues of the day. The 
quotes, they wrote, reaffirmed his “reputation as a straight talker.”
challenging popular ideas | Now to the highlights of his excel-
lent book of essays.
One of the most informative and important of Bill’s essays 
is his “R&D and Economic Growth: Cautionary Thoughts.” He 
leads with Bill Clinton’s statement, “American history clearly 
demonstrates the importance of American leadership in science 
and technology to the future of our Nation.” Bill then writes:
I wonder to which American history President Clinton was refer-
ring. The United States had become the richest nation in the 
world long before there was significant “American leadership in 
science and technology.”
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He then goes on to criticize “Bacon’s chain,” which is, quot-
ing Bill, the following chain of reasoning:
[G]overnment financing is necessary to provide the adequate 
level of basic research, which is necessary to provide the scientific 
foundation for advanced technology, which accounts for a large 
part of economic growth.
He proceeds to work backwards from the last part of the chain to 
the first, blowing large analytic and empirical holes in each link 
of the chain. On the last link, he points out one of the dirtiest 
“unsecrets” of economists who study growth: even though we say 
that technology accounts for more than 50 percent of productiv-
ity growth, “‘technology’ is one of economists’ two favorite code 
words for what they do not understand.”
On the middle link, Bill points to evidence that, in the short 
term, “most technological innovation is based on other advances 
in technology, with little contribution from recent advances 
in basic research.” On the first link, he notes that economists 
have treated this claim as self-evident rather than establishing it 
empirically. He points out that “private finance was the largest 
source of support [of basic research] until the 1950s,” and that 
separate studies by two prominent economists, Edwin Mansfield 
and Zvi Griliches, found that firms’ profits depended on their 
own investment in basic science.
He also added insight to the debate on global warming. In a 
1997 article, “Too Much, Too Soon: Is a Global Warming Treaty 
a Rush to Judgment?” he points out that the case for a global 
warming treaty depends on the accuracy of seven ideas: 
■■ Continued increases in emissions of greenhouse gases will 
increase global temperatures. 
■■ Such an increase in temperature will create more costs than 
benefits. 
■■ Emissions controls are the most efficient means to prevent 
an increase in temperature. 
■■ It is better to control emissions earlier than later. 
■■ Emissions controls can be effectively monitored and 
enforced.
■■ Governments of the treaty countries will approve the neces-
sary control measures.
■■ Controlling emissions in the rich countries several decades 
earlier than in the poor countries is desirable.
Bill shows why the case for any one of those seven statements 
“is surprisingly weak.” Although I can’t, in a short space, recount 
his serial reasoning, I’ll settle for noting one of his arguments. 
Concerning the costs and benefits of global warming, he writes 
that most of the global warming “is expected to be at night, in 
the winter, and in the high northern latitudes.” That means 
that heating costs would be reduced more than cooling costs 
would be increased. 
Some 14 years after his article was written, the case for each 
of the seven statements is still quite weak. Interestingly, con-
cerning international cooperation to reduce carbon emissions, 
the Canadian government withdrew from the Kyoto treaty in 
December 2011.
In a more narrowly economic piece, “The Economic Burden of 
Taxation,” he presents a simple model of the U.S. economy, which 
he then estimates empirically. His shocking finding is that for an 
additional dollar of government spending to be worthwhile, the 
dollar must create $2.75 in value. Concludes Bill: “One wonders 
whether there are any government programs for which the mar-
ginal value is that high” (italics his).
Battling the beast | One of the book’s essays for which Bill is 
best known is his 2006 “The Failure to ‘Starve the Beast.’” He 
criticizes the idea, articulated by economists Milton Friedman 
and Gary Becker and by politician Ronald Reagan, that the only 
way to cut the size of government is to reduce its revenues. This 
idea has driven the policy views of small-government Republi-
cans at the federal level for at least the last quarter of a century. 
There are three main problems with this view, notes Bill:
■■ As an economic theory, it’s implausible. 
■■ The evidence is against it. 
■■ It diverts attention from the tough job of achieving political 
reforms to rein in government spending. 
He presents evidence that, for every percentage point increase 
in federal government revenue, federal spending as a share of 
GDP fell by one seventh of a percentage point, the opposite of 
what the “starve the beast” view would predict. That makes sense. 
Most people see taxes as the “price” of government. When taxes 
increase, the amount of government that people demand falls.
While himself a huge contributor to the “public choice” analy-
sis of government, especially of bureaucracy, Bill does not hesitate 
to highlight the failings of public choice. In a 1998 book review of 
public choice essays, he points out that one of the key phenom-
ena to explain is why government grew significantly in so many 
countries in the 20th century. His conclusion:
Public choice does not contribute much to understanding the 
most important general political event of our lifetime. 
Though a microeconomist by training and inclination, Bill 
had good insights about some major macroeconomic issues. 
Consider his 2005 article, “Alternative Political and Economic 
Futures for Europe.” In 2005 the economic situation in Europe 
looked much calmer than it does today. He wrote, “My own guess 
is that the European Monetary Union will not survive 10 more 
years.” Given all the turmoil in the European Union these days, 
how’s that for a prediction? 
In another 2005 piece on Europe, “Advice from a Friendly 
American,” he makes critical comments on a proposed constitu-
tion for Europe:
One sentence [of the proposed constitution] alone, for example, 
commits the Union to “work for a Europe of sustainable develop-
ment based on balanced economic growth, with a social market 
economy aiming at full employment and social progress,” a 
sentence that includes at least five undefined terms. 
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That is Bill’s dry, pointed humor at its best.
He was also a perceptive and fair critic of other economists 
and economic writers. His reviews of Paul Krugman’s 1996 
book, Pop Internationalism, and of Robert Kuttner’s 1997 book, 
Everything for Sale: The Virtues and Limits of Markets, are two cases in 
point. About Krugman, Bill writes that he has “wisdom beyond 
his years” (Krugman was only 43 when the book was published), 
that he is “a creative writer and a brilliant analyst,” and that “he 
can be as arrogant when he is wrong as when he is right.” That’s 
a nice summing up of Paul Krugman circa 1996. 
In his review of Kuttner’s book, Bill writes:
Robert Kuttner may be the most thoughtful, best informed writer 
about economics on the American left. He is also profoundly 
wrong about many issues.
Foreign policy | Niskanen was one of the first to criticize 
George W. Bush’s case for war with Iraq. He spoke out against 
it in December 2001. His article, “An Unnecessary War Is an 
Unjust War,” makes the case tersely. 
On the cold war, though, I think Bill was wrong. In a 2005 
speech, “A Reflection on the Major Developments in the World, 
1951–2000,” he writes:
We should remember and honor those political leaders who initi-
ated or sustained the measures that made it possible for the West 
to prevail in the Cold War: Truman and Reagan, Churchill and 
Thatcher, Adenauer and Kohl.
There are two problems with this claim. First, the evidence that 
the Soviet Union fell due to the efforts of those six political lead-
ers is actually skimpy. Second, I do not think there needed to be a 
cold war because the Soviet government, while a horrible threat 
to its own people, was not much of a threat to the United States 
or even to Western Europe. Perhaps the older Bill Niskanen who 
saw through the rationales for the Iraq war, if he had taken a fresh 
look at the cold war, would have agreed with me.
Surprisingly, given his strong understanding of the benefits of 
free trade, Bill makes a simple error in discussing those benefits. 
In the earlier-mentioned “Alternative Political and Economic 
Futures for Europe,” he writes, “[M]any of the poorer nations of 
the world have little reason to accept the exports and investments 
by the industrial countries if they cannot sell us their agricultural 
products.” That’s false. Barriers to imports of their agricultural 
products do hurt them: there’s no doubt about that. But accepting 
“our” exports and investments would definitely help them whether 
or not we have barriers against their products. This is a small error, 
though, relative to the numerous insights in this book.
Bill’s book is a keeper, especially since it will be one of our 
main reminders of a tough-minded and humane man. I will 
miss him.
David R. Henderson is a research fellow with the Hoover Institution 
and an associate professor of economics at the Graduate School of Busi-
ness and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif. 
He is the editor of The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics (Liberty Fund, 2008). 
He blogs at www.econlog.econlib.org. 
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I am a small-scale landscaper, but the government demands
    I spend 3,000 hours to get a license to spray a weed killer
        that anyone can buy in a hardware store. 
           I am fighting big government’s efforts to help big 
              business by weeding out the little guys like me.
        I am IJ.
